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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT,
CaseNo.20111026-CA
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.
ROBERT BENNION,
Defendant / Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to § 78A-3-102(4).
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are reproduced as Addendum A to Appellant's Brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-1 -904 (2007)
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-5-825 (2008)
The following are attached hereto as Addendum "A":
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-801 (2004)
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-802 (2004)
l
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Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-803 (2004)
Restatement (Third) of Property §4.13
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 29, 2008, Plaintiff North Fork Special Service District ("NFSSD")
filed a Complaint against Defendant Robert Bennion ("Bennion"), in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Provo Department, State of Utah, the Honorable Steven L. Hansen
("Judge Hansen") presiding. R. 1-6. Bennion filed his Answer to the Complaint on May
21, 2008. R. 10-20. On May 27, 2008, Bennion filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint. R. 21-27. On June 18, 2008, NFSSD filed an Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss. R. 33-40. On July 2, 2008, Bennion filed a Reply Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. R. 41-47. On August 25, 2008, Bennion's
Motion to Dismiss was before the trial court for oral arguments, and Judge Hansen ruled
(1) Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action would be Dismissed (not at issue for this appeal),
and (2) that Bennion had ten days to file "a final brief " and NFSSD then had ten days to
submit its "final brief." R. 58, attached hereto as Addendum "B." On September 3,
2008, Bennion submitted his "final brief," i.e. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. R. 62-81. On September 17, 2008, NFSSD submitted
its "final brief," i.e. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss. R. 101-132. On October 1, 2008, the trial court entered a Decision
regarding Bennion's Motion to Dismiss. R. 151-55, attached hereto as Addendum "C."
2
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On May 19, 2010, NFSSD filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 170-209.
On June 14, 2010, Bennion filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment. R. 210-63. However, NFSSD filed a Motion to Strike Portions of
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
Exhibit "A" to Defendant's Opposition Memorandum - Robert Bennion's Affidavit, and
Exhibit "F" to Defendant's Opposition Memorandum - Excerpts from Pamela Vincent's
Deposition ("Motion to Strike"). R. 279-90. NFSSD's Motion to Strike was folly
briefed. R. 291-305.
After NFSSD filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for
Summary Judgment, said motion was heard by the trial court. R. 265-78 and R. 445.
The trial court granted NFSSD's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike.
R. 445 _ NFSSD's Mot. S.J. and NFSSD's Mot. to Strike, Hearing Transcript (June 8,
2011), attached hereto as Addendum "D." The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and an order granting
summary judgment in favor of NFSSD. R. 406-13, and Addendum "B" to Appellant's
Brief (March 13, 2012). The trial court also granted NFSSD's Motion to Strike. R. 414421, attached hereto as Addendum "E" - Order on NFSSD's Mot. to Strike. See also R.
445. Bennion filed a notice of appeal with the trial court on November 10, 2011. R. 44041.

3
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
NFSSD is a special service district duly organized and authorized pursuant to Utah
State Law. R. 207 and R. 261. All property owners located within the boundaries of
NFSSD are required to pay a monthly base fee for access to water, fire protection, and
garbage collection services provided by NFSSD. R. 188,194,206, 412. Such fees have
been established by NFSSD's board of directors ("the Board"), and the Board has
established additional fees and penalties if a North Fork member fails to timely pay the
fees established and imposed by NFSSD, e.g. interest at the rate of 12% per annum on
delinquent accounts. R. 188, 194, 206, 412. Moreover, NFSSD is authorized to charge
an excess water usage fee to the members who use more than 5,000 gallons during one
month. R. 188, 194, 206, 412. The amount NFSSD charges property owners for excess
water usage is based on a graduated scale adopted by the Board. R. 188, 194, 206,412.
At all times relevant to this action, Bennion was the record property owner of real
property located at 9403 Canopy Lane, Utah County, State of Utah (hereinafter referred
to as "the Bennion property" or "the Property"). R. 5-6, 19, 194. Bennion's property
falls within the North Fork Special Service District jurisdiction and boundaries. R. 5-6,
19, 194.
NFSSD continuously provided the Bennion property with water, garbage
collection, and fire protection services for several years, including at all times relevant to
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this case, and invoice statements were customarily and routinely sent on a quarterly basis
toBennion. R. 188, 193-94, 206, 412.
Bennion's appellate brief contains three pages labeled "Factual Background"1 that
are completely irrelevant to this case. Appellant's Brief, 5-7. Fourth district court
decisions have determined time and time again that the matters asserted in Appellant's
Brief regarding the history of water in the North Fork district, Pamela Vincent, and
Robert Redford have already been litigated or are simply not relevant. R. 177-83,
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for prior collection case) attached hereto as
Addendum "F," and R. 445. See also Addendum "G" - Fourth District Court decisions
regarding Bennion v. Pamela Vincent and/or NFSSD.
The case before the Court is merely a simple action to collect for past due service
fees and is not related whatsoever to Bennion's claims of Robert Redford's alleged
promises to Utah County, bond funds for a culinary water system, or other connections to
water lines within NFSSD's water delivery system. R. 1-6, 194, 205.

Over the course of several years, Bennion refused to pay for any service fees to
NFSSD. R. 177-83,193,205, 208,257-58. NFSSD previously filed suit against
Bennion for unpaid base service fees as well as over-usage fees, together with interest
1

Bennion asserts these statements as a "Factual Background" because they were
provided to the trial court. However, these "facts" were provided merely as an
introduction to a pleading in the trial court, and not actually asserted as facts supported by
evidence. R. 77-80.
5
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and penalties. R. 208. That case was titled North Fork Special Service District v.
Bennion, Fourth Judicial District Court, Provo Department, State of Utah, Case No.
040401235 (hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 040401235"). R. 208. See also
Addendum "F."
At a hearing held on November 10, 2005 (Order entered on January 24, 2006),
regarding Case No. 040401235, the Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott ("Judge Stott")
granted NFSSD's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Bennion for base user
fees incurred by BennionfromJanuary 1, 1997 through January 1, 2002, in the amount of
$3,524.31, which represented $2,038.00 for outstanding base user fees and $1,486.31 in
accrued interest. R. 207-08. The remaining issues for trial in Case No. 040401235 were
(1) whether or not Bennion was responsible for the excess water usage along a lateral
water line servicing the Bennion property, and (2) whether NFSSD was entitled to
attorney fees associated with prosecuting the matter. R. 207.
A trial was held on October 10, 2008, to determine the remaining issues of Case
No. 040401235. R. 207. Judge Stott found Bennion was responsible for not only the
base user fees, but also the excess water usage fees during the time in question. R. 17783. Judge Stott granted judgment against Bennion in the amount of $ 11,706.98 for
excess water usage fees, plus interest and attorney fees. R. 177-83.
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The case now before this Court has the same factual basis as Case No. 040401235,
except the compensation for which Plaintiff seeks unpaid user fees covers a different
period of time. R. 207.
Bennion claims that in 1998, he "shut off the valve where the water enters his
home." Appellant's Brief, 7. However, he fails to mention that this issue was before the
Fourth District Court, and at the bench trial, Judge Stott heard evidence that there are
other users in the North Fork district that would be materially affected if Bennion were to
shut off his water, and Pamela Vincent had previously obtained a TRO because
Bennion mechanically altered the connections in a junction box located
where the residential water line servicing Pamela Vincent and Robert
Bennion's homes branch from the main water line so as to shut off all
the water along the road on which the parties' live.. .Pamela Vincent
filed a complaint and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining Robert Bennion from interfering with the delivery of water.
See Addendum "G," p. 2, §§5-6.
NFSSD is responsible for the maintenance of the main water lines of its water
delivery system. R. 182, 188, 411. NFSSD is not responsible for maintenance of lateral
water lines that connect to the main water lines of NFSSD's water delivery system. R.
182,188,411. Rather, individual property owners are responsible for the maintenance of
lateral water lines servicing their properties. R. 182, 188, 411. Prior to November 1997
through March 31, 2009, Bennion has been the owner of the lateral water line from the
point it connects to the NFSSD's main water line at a meter box located north of the
Bennion property to the meter box south of the Bennion property that is located on a
7
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property adjacent to the Bennion property (hereinafter referred to as "the Bennion Lateral
Water Line'5). R. 179, 181-82, 187,410-11. Bennion is responsible for water taken out
of the Bennion Lateral Water Line regardless of whether or not he personally utilizes
such water or whether the water is lost through leaks located in the Bennion Lateral
Water Line. R. 181, 187, 410. This determination was made by the trial court because of
the testimony presented at trial (in Case No. 040401235) that Bennion prohibited NFSSD
from placing a meter on the Bennion Lateral Water Line that would have more accurately
determined how much water was actually used by Bennion. R. 180-81.
Bennion continuously refused to allow NFSSD's employees or agents on the
Bennion property to fix and service the Bennion Lateral Water Line. R. 187, 410, 445.
The leaks that may have contributed to the excess water usage through the Bennion
Lateral Water Line were remedied only after NFSSD obtained injunctive relief to enter
the Bennion property to fix and service the water delivery system. R. 187, 410. The
reason NFSSD was forced to obtain injunctive relief was due to threats - including
threats of violence - made by Bennion against NFSSD's representatives who were trying
to address the problem. R. 187, 410, 445 (9:15-20).
Bennion continues to argue moot points through his unmerited litigation.
Bennion's actions and continued litigation have been pursued in bad faith, resulting in
Plaintiff incurring extensive legal fees to pursue its legal rights. R. 178-80, 186, 192,
408-08,445.
8
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As stated previously, this is a simple case for collection of fees. Between
February 28, 2004 and March 31, 2009, approximately 14,700,268 gallons of water were
taken out of NFSSD's water system by way of the Bennion Lateral Water Line. R. 18687, 410. This is based on meter readings taken between the between the two points of the
Bennion Lateral Water Line. R. 186-87, 410. Bennion is obligated to pay for his base
user fees (access to water up to 5,000 gallons/month, fire protection, and sanitation
services), as well as interest. R. 193, 410-11.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINTI.
The trial court's ruling to not limit the amount of damages that NFSSD can collect to
$200 a month should be upheld for two reasons. First, Bennion has incorrectly
interpreted §17B-2-804 (2004) to limit the amount of fees NFSSD can collect to $200 a
month. The correct interpretation of § 17B-2-804 is that a service district is allowed to
recover all of the delinquent user fees when it brings a civil action for the collection of
those fees and is limited to $200 in the amount it can recover in collection fees when the
suit is brought for services provided to a residential property. Second, Bennion failed to
properly preserve for appeal the issue of the $200 limitation under § 17B-2-804.
Specifically, Bennion did not raise this issue in a manner that would give the trial court
an opportunity to rule on the issue. Based on these two reasons, the trial court's decision
in regards to the monetary judgment awarded to NFSSD should be upheld.
9
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POINT II.
Bennion asserts he is not liable for excess water fees from September 22, 2006 - the date
NFSSD obtained an Order of Immediate Occupancy - through October 2007. This is a
question of fact and law. However, Bennion did not properly marshal the evidence
related to this issue. Moreover, NFSSD is not responsible for water taken out of the
Bennion Lateral Water Line, despite the Order of Immediate Occupancy. The leaks in
the Bennion Lateral Water Line were well documented before NFSSD ever acquired the
right to enter Bennion's Property, and that right did not cause "damages" to Bennion's
Property. Rather, Bennion is obligated to pay for any excess water fees associated with
the Bennion Lateral Water Line.
POINT III.
Bennion's repeated pursuit of irrelevant and unmerited claims that involve third parties or
that are not related to the simple matter of collection for fees, and his refusal to ever pay
for any user fees required NFSSD to engage in protracted litigation. Bennion's continued
attempts at relitigating issues have been pursued in bad faith, and the trial court's
decision to award NFSSD's attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-825 was
correct.
//
//
//
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO NOT LIMIT NFSSD'S USER FEES TO
TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH SHOULD BE UPHELD AS §17B-2-804
DOES NOT LIMIT NFSSD'S USER FEES TO TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS A
MONTH AND BECAUSE BENNION FAILED TO PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR
APPEAL.
A.

Section 17B-2-804(3)(b), Utah Code Annotated, Does Not Limit the Amount
that Special Service District's Can Recover in a Civil Action to Two Hundred
Dollars.
Special service districts are allowed to collect more than a total of two hundred

dollars ($200.00) when they bring a lawsuit for the collection of unpaid user fees.
Bennion argues that under Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804(3)(b) (2004), a special service
district is prohibited from collecting more than $200 a month from a service user
regardless of how much the user owes in delinquent service fees. This argument is
contrary to the intent of the statute and common sense principles. The following
information shows that the language of §17B-2-804(3)(b) is ambiguous, but when the
statute is read in conjunction with other portions of the Code and the intent of the statute,
it is clear that a service district may bring a civil action to collect the full amount of user
fees it is owed plus an additional $200.00 for collection costs.
1.

Certain Language in Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804(3)(b) is Ambiguous.

Section 17B-2-804(b) is ambiguous as the language in certain portions of the
statute are subject to multiple interpretations. A statute is deemed to be ambiguous if it is
n
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susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Marion Energy, Inc., v. KFJ
Ranch Partn., 267 P.3d 863, 866-67 (Utah 2011). In the present matter, the $200
limitation set forth in § 17B-2-804(3)(b) is interpreted differently by NFSSD and
Bennion. The portion of Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804(3) that is ambiguous reads as
follows:
(3) (a) A local district may file a civil action against the customer if the
customer fails to pay the past due service fees amd collection costs within
30 calendar days from the date on which the local district mailed notice
under Subsection (l)(b).
(b) (i) In a civil action under this Subsection (3), a customer is liable to the
local district for an amount that:
(A) consists of past due service fees, collection costs, interest, court
costs, a reasonable attorney fee, and damages; and
(B) if the customer's property is residential, may not exceed $200.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b)(i), a court may, upon a finding of
good cause, waive interest, court costs, the attorney fee, and damages, or
any combination of them.
(c) If a local district files a civil action under this Subsection (3) before 31
calendar days after the day on which the local district mailed notice under
Subsection (l)(b), a customer may not be held liable for an amount in
excess of past due service fees.
(d) A local district may not file a civil action under this Subsection (3)
unless the customer has failed to pay the past due service fees and
collection costs within 30 days from the day on which the local district
mailed notice under Subsection (l)(b).
The correct interpretation of the $200 limitation language in §17B-2-804(3)(b) is
that it limits the collection costs that a service district can collect in a civil suit to $200.
12
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Bennion interprets the statutory language differently. Bennion currently interprets the
statute to limit a service district's total judgment to $200 a month if it brings a civil action
to recover delinquent service fees. This interpretation by Bennion differs from his own
previous interpretation of the statute. In documents filed with the trial court2, Bennion
interpreted the $200 provision to limit a service district's total judgment to $200 in a civil
suit for the collection of fees. R. 72-75. Bennion seems to now recognize that such an
interpretation is untenable and has modified his interpretation to something that he
believes will be more palatable to the Court. The fallacies with both of Bennion's
interpretations will be addressed later. The point at this time is that the specific language
of the statute is subject to different interpretations. Accordingly, the language of the
statute is ambiguous and other factors must be considered to determine the meaning of
the statute.
2.

The Language Contained in the Statutes Related to Utah Code Ann.
§17B-2-804, Provides that in a Civil Suit a Service District is Not
Limited to Collecting $200 in Delinquent User Fees.

As the language in Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804 (2004) relating to the $200
limitation, if read in isolation, is ambiguous, the Court is able to look at related statutes to
determine the meaning of specific provisions in §17B-2-804. In State v. Schofield, the
Utah Supreme Court stated that when interpreting statutes,
2

As is stated in this brief, the pleadings filed by Bennion that reference the $200 limit
and Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 were never properly placed before the Court and did
not preserve the issue for appeal.
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the plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions
interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with
other statutes under the same and related chapters. 63 P.3d 667, 669-70
(Utah 2002) (further citations omitted).
When the language in Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804(3)(b) is read in connection with the
other provisions of the chapter, it is clear that the $200 limitation applies to collection
costs and not delinquent user fees.
Section 17B-2-801 et seq. of Utah Code Ann. was created to establish procedures
for the collection of delinquent water and sewer service fees. Section 17B-2-802, inter
alia, gives a service district the authority to terminate water and sewer services if a user is
delinquent in his user fee payments. Specifically, subsection of (l)(b) of Section 802
states that if a user fails to pay for services provided, then the service district can stop
providing the service "until all amounts for water furnished or sewer service provided,
respectively, are paid

" Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-802(l)(b). Similarly, Utah Code

Ann. §17B-2-803 (2004) gives a service district the ability to place a lien on a property
until all of the delinquent user fees are collected. Subsection (5) of section 803 indicates
that a service district does not have to release its lien until it is paid all it is owed in
delinquent user fees that necessitated the lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-803(5).
Neither sections 802 or 803 limit in any way, much less to $200 a month, the amount of
delinquent user fees that a service district can collect. In fact, both sections provide
specifically that the service district may continue the identified collection tool until all
delinquent user fees are paid.
14
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Utah Code Ann.§ 17B-2-804 (2004), upon which Bennion relies, is a continuation
of sections 802 and 803 in that it provides another avenue for service districts to collect
delinquent user fees, which avenue is to file a civil lawsuit. When section 804 is read in
connection with the other sections of the chapter, it is clear that the $200 limitation
applies only to collection fees and not delinquent user fees. If we were to accept
Bennion's interpretation of the $200 limitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. §17B-2804(3)(b), then a service district could turn off a user's services until the sendee district
was paid all delinquent user fees. The service district could also place a lien on the
property until all delinquent water fees were paid. But, if the service district filed a
lawsuit to collect delinquent water fees, then it could only collect $200 total or $200 a
month, depending upon which of Bennion's interpretations is applied. Both
interpretations by Bennion are illogical. It makes no sense that a service district can
collect all delinquent user fees if it terminates services or files a lien, but it is limited in
the service fees it can collect if it files a lawsuit.
Conversely, NFSSD's interpretation, that a service district which files a lawsuit to
collect delinquent user fees may collect all of the delinquent user fees and is only limited
in the amount of collection costs it can recover, is in complete harmony with the other
statutes providing means for a service district to collect delinquent user fees. NFSSD's
interpretation of the $200 limitation is consistent with related statutes and as such it is the
correct interpretation of the statute.
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3.

The Other Provisions of Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804 Show that
Service Districts That File a Civil Lawsuit Are Not Limited to $200 a
Month in the Collection of Delinquent User Fees.

Not only is NFSSD's interpretation of the $200 limitation set forth in Utah Code
Ann. §17B-2-804(3)(b) consistent with related statutes, such interpretation is in harmony
with the other language in section 804. As set forth in the previously referenced case
law, when interpreting a particular provision of a statute, courts should consider the
statute as a whole, i.e. provisions of a statute should be interpreted so that they are
consistent with each other and do not create illogical or contradictory interpretations.
The other provisions of section 804 support NFSSD's interpretation of subsection (3)(b)
that filing a civil lawsuit does not limit the amount of delinquent user fees that a service
district can collect in a suit.
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004) provides three steps for a service district to
follow in the collection of delinquent fees. The first step identified in subsection (1) is
for the service district to mail notice of the delinquent fees to the user. The second step
set forth in subsection (2) is for the service district to send a letter to the user stating that
it will not file a civil lawsuit if the user pays the delinquent service fees plus collection
costs, pre-litigation damages, and $50 in attorney's fees. This section provides a $100
limit for residential property. The third step, which is identified in subsection (3), is for
the service district to file a lawsuit. Subsection (3)(b) provides a limit of $200 for
residential property. Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004).
16
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If we were to accept Bennion's interpretation of subsection (2), then the most the
service district could collect in delinquent user fees, interest, attorney's fees, collection
costs, and damages would be $100. This interpretation is contrary to common sense and
is impractical. Service fees for water and sewer are regularly over $100 a month. Under
the statute, a service district cannot even send the letter asking for payment until 30 days
after it has sent notice of the delinquent fees. If Bennion's interpretation of subsection
(2) were accurate, then a water user could use as much water as he wanted over a
multiple month period and only have to pay $100 to avoid a lawsuit regardless of the
amount he owed in delinquent user fees. This $100 would also include the $50 fee the
service district is able to charge for its attorney. Thus, under Bennion's interpretation of
subsection (2), a water user could receive several months of water service for a total $50.
This interpretation by Bennion of subsection (2) is obviously flawed and contrary
to common sense principles. Whereas, NFSSD's interpretation that the $100 limitation
referenced in subsection (2) relates only to collection costs is in harmony with common
sense and the other provisions of the statute. As the proper interpretation of subsection
(2) of section 804 is that the $100 limitation applies to collection costs and not delinquent
user fees, then NFSSD's interpretation that the $200 limitation in subsection (3)(b)
applies only to collection costs is in harmony with subsection (2).
Additionally, the three steps outlined in section 804 show that the statute is
designed to give the user an opportunity and a motivation to pay the delinquent user fees
17
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before a lawsuit is filed. If Bennion's interpretation of subsection (3)(b) were accepted,
there would be no motivation for a user to settle prior to a lawsuit. This is because under
Bennion's interpretation, if a user paid after receiving the notice, he would have to pay
the entire delinquent amount. But, if the user waited to pay until he received the 30 day
letter, the maximum he would have to pay is $100 even if his delinquent user fees were
well over $100. And, if the user waited until a lawsuit was filed, the maximum he would
have to pay is $200. Under this interpretation by Bennion, a service district would have
no motivation for filing a lawsuit as the filing fee alone would be more than $200.
Obviously, Bennion's interpretation of subsection (3)(b) is inconsistent with the
three steps outlined in section 804. Whereas, NFSSD's interpretation that the $200
limitation applies only to collection costs is in-step with the other provisions of section
804. Accordingly, NFSSD's interpretation of subsection (3)(b) is the correct
interpretation.
4.

The Intent and Purpose of Title 17B, Chapter 2, Part 8, Was to Allow a
Service District to Collect All Delinquent User Fees.

Part 8 of Title 17B, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann., was intended to provide a means
whereby service districts could collect user fees from the parties who incurred the user
fees. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen interpreting statutes, our primary
goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 52
P.3d 1276, 1278 (Utah 2002) (further citations omitted). As stated previously, Part 8
provides three different avenues for a service district to collect fees: (1) terminate
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services, (2) file a lien, and (3) file a civil lawsuit. All three of these avenues are
designed to assist service districts in the collection of delinquent user fees. This is
evidenced by the title of Part 8, which is "Collection of Water and Service Fees." Thus,
the language and the procedures of the statute clearly show that the intent of the statute
was to help in the collection of delinquent service fees not to limit the collection to $200.
Furthermore, the Utah legislative history associated with Part 8 shows that the
$200 limitation was to apply to collection costs not the delinquent user fees. The
following is an excerpt from the legislative hearing leading up to the adoption of section
804:
For the discussion, Rep Clark.
Thank you Mr. Speaker.
I wonder if the sponsor of the amendment would answer a question.
Rep Murray will you yield?
-Yes
Proceed
I need a little clarification. This particular section of the bill deals with, not
the amount of service that's past due, but it says with the appropriate court
costs, attorney fees and other damages in the amount equal to the greater of
$100 or triple the amount, the past due amount, not to exceed $200. I'm not
sure that this deals with the service aspect of it, but this deals with what's
available to the district for collecting. Do you have an opinion on that?
- Well it wouldn't cover the entire thing, but it would be closer than $200
would.
Ok well thank you, I stand against[?] this particular amendment and let me
tell you why. I appreciate what the sponsor of the bill has done to try and
improve the content of this bill. But what we do with the water district right
now is that we allow that water to have a special position when it comes to
the lien rights that are associated with this that we don't give to anybody
else. We allow them, if the water is past due, they have the option of their
19
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-

collection. They can shut off the water and the amount that's past due then
can be certified as a tax lien on the property. So they have the ability of,
rather than going to court and going through judicial process, they are given
the special privilege of having that certified and a lien attached to the
property. What this is saying is that those costs associated with that should
not exceed $200. If they want to go to $500, I'm fine with that, but then
they should be able to go back through and do the judicial process and not
be treated separately or special in the certification of it. If they are able to
certify that bill, all they need is the $200 to cover the cost of collection that
is associated with it and not to get the attorney's fees any higher than that. I
think there is a special dispensation given to these folks in this process and
this is not needed and $200 is more than adequate to cover the costs of the
special certification of the lien.
Thank you, Mr. Clark
House Hearing on HB 56 "Local Government Collection for Service Charges," Day 40,
<http://www.le. state.ut.us/isp^
s^true>, (last updated February 16, 2004).
This excerpt from the legislative hearing on this statute shows that the $200 limitation
was not meant to apply to the delinquent user fees but only to the collection fees.
Accordingly, Bennion's interpretation of the $200 limitation is incorrect and should be
rejected.
5.

Summary of Argument that subsection (3)(b) of Utah Code Ann. §17B2-804 Does Not Limit the Amount of Service User Fees that NFSSD
Can Collect from Bennion to $200.

The above information shows that the specific language in subsection (3)(b) of
Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804 is ambiguous in regards to what collection amounts are
limited to $200. However, a review of the statute as a whole and the purpose and intent
of the statute makes clear that the $200 limitation referenced in subsection (3)(b) applies
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only to collection costs and not delinquent user fees. Accordingly, the Court should
uphold the trial court's ruling in regards to the amount of delinquent user fees Bennion
owes NFSSD, including base user fees, excess water fees, and interest, as has been
adopted by NFSSD's Board.
B.

Bennion's Appeal Seeking to Limit NFSSD's Judgment to $200 a Month
Under Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804 Should be Denied as Such Issue Was Not
Properly Preserved for Appellate Review,
Even assuming argumendo that the Court found Bennion's interpretation of Utah

Code Ann. §17B-2-804 (2004) was correct and that NFSSD was entitled to a judgment of
no more than $200 a month for delinquent user fees, Bennion's appeal on this issue still
should be denied as he failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal. To preserve an
issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court "in such a way that the trial
court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 372-73
(Utah 2007) (further citations omitted). There are three elements that must be satisfied
for there to be a finding that the trial court had an opportunity to rule on the issue. Those
elements are "1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; 2) the issue must be
specifically raised; and 3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority." Id. If all three of these elements are not met, then an issue has not been
preserved for appeal In the present matter, Bennion has failed to satisfy any of the three
elements necessary to preserve for appeal the issue of limiting NFSSD's judgment to
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$200 a month under Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 (2004) for delinquent user fees during
the relevant time period.
1.

Bennion Did Not Properly Raise the Issue of the $200 Limitation
Pursuant to §17B-2-804 in a Timely Fashion.

The information set forth in the next two sections will show that Bennion never
properly raised the $200 limitation issue under Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 at the trial
court level. Accordingly, he failed to satisfy the first element necessary to preserve an
issue for appeal, which is to timely raise the appealed issue.
2.

Bennion Did Not Specifically Bring Before the Trial Court the Issue
Relating to the $200 Limitation Under §17B-2-804.

At no to time did Bennion properly bring before the trial court the issue relating to
the $200 limitation under Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804. Bennion claims in his Appellate
Brief that he preserved this issue through both his Motion to Dismiss pleadings and
Summary Judgment pleadings. Appellant's Brief, p. 2, § 1. However, a review of the
pleadings on both of these motions show that Bennion failed to properly raise the issue of
the $200 limitation under Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804.
Bennion did not raise the issue of the §17B-2-804 limitation in his Motion to
Dismiss. R. 21-27. He did not raise the issue in his Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss. R. 41-47. Bennion did raise the $200 limitation issue under Utah
Code Ann. §17B-l-904 during oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss. R. 58, 81. But,
he did not raise the issue under § 17B-2-804. R. 58. After oral arguments on the Motion
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to Dismiss, the trial court allowed each party to file one supplemental brief on the $200
limitation issue. R. 58. In his Supplemental Memorandum in Support of his Motion to
Dismiss, Bennion only raised the issue of the $200 limitation in the context of § 17B-1904. R. 62-81. He did not raise the issue in the context of §17B-2-804. R. 62-81.
Accordingly, the trial court made its order on the Motion to Dismiss under §17B-1-904,
which is the statute Bennion presented to the trial court in his pleadings. R. 151-55.
Bennion did raise the issue of the $200 limitation under §17B-2-804 in a Supplemental
Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. R. 137-43. However, this
pleading was not authorized or accepted by the trial court since the trial court ordered
each party was allowed to submit one "final brief for supplemental briefing on
Bennion's Motion to Dismiss. R. 58. The trial court makes no reference to this
unauthorized pleading in its Decision on the Motion to Dismiss. R. 151-55. Thus, this
unauthorized pleading did not bring the issue before the trial court as it was never
considered by the court.
As Bennion did not bring the issue of the $200 limitation under Utah Code Ann.
§17B-2-804 before the trial court through an authorized pleading, he did not give the trial
court an opportunity to rule on that issue in the Motion to Dismiss proceedings.
Therefore, he did not properly raise the issue in the Motion to Dismiss proceedings.
Similarly, Bennion did not properly raise the issue of the $200 limitation under
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 in his Summary Judgment pleading. The only pleading
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filed by Bennion in the summary judgment proceedings was his Memorandum in
Opposition to NFSSD's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 210-63. In his summary
judgment opposition, Bennion did raise the $200 limitation under §17B-2-804. R. 24648. However, NFSSD filed a Motion to Strike portions of Bennion's Opposition
including the portion relating to § 17B-2-804. R. 265-90. Moreover, at oral argument on
NFSSD's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike, Bennion did not mention
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804. R. 445. The trial court granted NFSSD's Motion to Strike
and did not consider §17B-2-804 in its summary judgment ruling. R. 396, 414-21.
Bennion's appeal to this Court does not include an appeal of the trial court's order
on the Motion to Strike. In order for a stricken pleading to be considered part of the
record on appeal, the appealing party must specifically appeal the order striking the
pleading. The Utah Court of Appeals made this point clear in its recent ruling in Maese
v. Tooele County, 2012 UT App. 49, when it stated as follows:
However, the IT affidavit was stricken from the record on foundational
grounds, and Maese did not appeal that decision. Indeed, Maese
acknowledged that the IT affidavit was stricken but nonetheless relies on it
in its appellate brief without any attempt to argue that it should not have
been stricken. Because the IT affidavit was stricken and Maese has not
challenged the propriety of the trial court's decision to strike it, the IT
affidavit is not properly on the record before us and we do not rely on it in
our analysis. Id. at T[ 8.
Thus, a party cannot rely on document that was stricken from the record on appeal if the
party has not specifically appealed the order striking the document from the record.
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Because Bennion's argument relating to Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 in his
Opposition to Summary Judgment was stricken and because he did not appeal the order
on the Motion to Strike, he failed to specifically raise the $200 limitation issue under
§ 17B-2-804 in the summary judgment proceedings.
As Bennion did not properly raise the § 17B-2-804 issue in the Motion to Dismiss
proceedings, the Summary Judgment proceedings, or in any other proceedings in the trial
court, he has failed to satisfy the second element necessary to preserve an issue for
appeal, which is to specifically raise the issue to the trial court.
3.

Bennion Did Not Introduce Supporting Evidence or Relevant Legal
Authority to the Trial Court Regarding the Alleged Limitation Under
Utah Code Ann. §17B-2-804.

In order to satisfy the final element necessary to preserve an issue for appeal, a
party must do more than mention an issue it must provide the trial court with evidence or
law in support of the issue. In State v. Cruz, the court stated that "merely mentioning..
.an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.. .does not
preserve that issue for appeal." 122 P.3d 543, 553 (Utah 2005) (further citations omitted).
Bennion failed to provide the trial court with any evidence or legal authority for his
theory that Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2-804 limits the amount NFSSD can recover to $200.
As set forth above, Bennion never put before the trial court in an acceptable form the
issue of § 17B-2-804 limiting the amount owed to $200. Nor did he ever cite relevant
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legal authority in a permissible manner for his position. Accordingly, Bennion failed to
satisfy the third element necessary to preserve an issue for appeal.
4.

Summary of Bennion's Failure to Preserve for Appeal the Utah Code
Ann. §17B-2-804 Issue.

Bennion cannot raise the §17B-2-804 issue at this time because he has failed to
satisfy any of the three required elements necessary to preserve an issue for appeal. He
did not timely raise the issue to the trial court, he did not specifically raise the issue, and
he did not provide the trial court with relevant legal authority. Therefore, Bennion failed
to give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the §17B-2-804 issue and thus did not
preserve the issue for appeal.
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT
BENNION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EXCESS WATER USAGE FEES FROM
SEPTEMBER 22, 2006 THROUGH OCTOBER 2007 BECAUSE BENNION
FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, AND NFSSD IS NOT
RESPONSIBLE FOR WATER TAKEN OUT OF THE BENNION LATERAL
WATER LINE.
Bennion claims that NFSSD is responsible for the excess water fees charged to
Bennion after September 22, 2006.3 Appellant's Brief, 27. Bennion asserts that once
NFSSD obtained an Order of Immediate Occupancy on September 22,2006, NFSSD had
a duty to maintain the easement, and therefore, Bennion is not responsible for any excess
3

Bennion previously claims NFSSD had a right to enter the property on May 31, 2007 not September 22, 2006. R. 254. Moreover, the "Order of Immediate Occupancy" was
issued by Judge Anthony W. Schofield on May 31, 2007, after which Bennion filed an
appeal, which was denied on or about July 2,2007. R. 277.
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water usage fees from September 22, 2006 through October 2007. Id. at 27-28.
However, the Court should affirm the trial court's order because Bennion failed to
marshal the evidence, and Bennion is responsible for the excess water fees attributed to
the Bennion Lateral Water Line.
A.

Bennion Failed to Properly Marshal the Evidence.

Bennion's appeal should be denied because he failed to properly marshal the
evidence. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9). Furthermore, the marshaling duty requires
a party to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." W.
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (UtahCt. App; 1991). If an
appellant fails to properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court may assume the
findings are correct or adequately supported by the record. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d
1177, 1181 (Utah 2004) (citing Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d228, 233
(Utah 1998)).
In the present case, Bennion asserts that he turned off the water to his property in
1998. Appellant's Brief, 24. However, Bennion fails to mention that he is the owner of
the Bennion Lateral Water Line, and he is responsible for water taken out of the Bennion
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Lateral Water Line regardless of whether or not he personally utilizes the water or water
is lost due to leaks along the Bennion Lateral Water Line. R. 1799 181, 187,410.
Bennion acknowledges that he refused to allowr NFSSD's representatives onto the
Property to service the lateral waterline line, but claims "that incident occurred well
before the time period at issue in this case." Appellant's Brief, 24. This implies that
Bennion would have allowed NFSSD agents on the Property during the time in question.
However, Bennion fails to address that he opposed NFSSD's efforts to gain access to the
Property to fix the lateral water line, and after Judge Schofield granted NFSSD's motion
for an order of immediate occupancy, Bennion appealed such decision. R. 277, 445
(9:17-20). Bennion has been uncooperative with NFSSD in remedying the assumed leaks
along the Bennion Lateral Water Line, including making threats of violence toward
NFSSD employees and/or agents in the past, which collectively played a role in NFSSD's
decision to seek the immediate occupancy order. R. 187, 204, 272.
In addition, Bennion asserts that "repairs to Mr. Bennion's lateral waterline
occurred in October 2007, the last date that NFSSD charged Mr. Bennion for water
overuse fees." Appellant's Brief, 25 (citing R. 173-75). However, this is incorrect, and
does not take into account all the evidence surrounding the timing of the Order of
Immediate Occupancy and repairs. First of all, the last water overuse charge was
$14,215.82 and applied to overages "from May to October 2007." R. 173 (emphasis
added). The Order of Immediate Occupancy issued on September 22,2006, clearly
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contemplates that (1) NFSSD was not going to repair, but rather, replace the damaged
water line, (2) the new pipe could not be installed before winter, and (3) only preliminary
work would be done at the site. R. 226. See also Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, p. 3.
More importantly, the Order of Immediate Occupancy makes no mention of absolving
Bennion in any way of his obligation to pay for any of the water charges due to the
"hundreds of gallons of water" lost each week through apparent leaks. R. 226. See also
Appellant's Brief, Addendum C.
Bennion has failed to properly marshal the evidence, and therefore, his appeal
regarding the excess water usage fees from September 22, 2006 through October 2007
should be denied.
B.

Bennion is Responsible for Excess Water Usage Charges Related to the
Bennion Lateral Water Line.

Despite the Order of Immediate Occupancy, Bennion is responsible for the excess
water charges. Bennion cites Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 18 P.2d 292 (Utah 1933) and
Nielson v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696 (Utah 1943) claiming that once NFSSD was granted
the Order of Immediate Occupancy, as holder of an easement, NFSSD was responsible
for any excess water usage fees after that point. Bennion cited Nielson, stating "[o]ne
acquiring an easement and right to travel over the lands of another not only assumes the
burden of maintenance of said right of way, but all other burdens incident to its use."
Nielson, 141 P.2d at 702. Bennion also asserts that "[t]he landowner is not liable for
damages caused by ordinary use of the land by him." Id.
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Bennion fails to distinguish those casesfromthis case. First of all, those cases
addressed damages to the dominant estate by the servient estate holder's use of the
easement. In the present case, the alleged leaks to the Bennion Lateral Water Line were
well established prior to NFSSD obtaining the Order of Immediate Occupancy. R. 18081. In addition, the excess water fees are not "damages," but rather "fees." Bennion does
not assert NFSSD caused "damages" due to NFSSD's use of any easement.
Moreover, Bennion has misapplied any duty for maintenance. The general rule
regarding duties to maintain a servient estate where both parties benefit is:
Joint use by the servient owner and the servitude beneficiary of
improvements used in enjoyment of an easement or profit, or of the
servient estate for the purpose authorized by the easement or profit,
gives rise to an obligation to contribute jointly to the costs reasonably
incurred for repair and maintenance of the portion of the servient
estate or improvements used in common.
Restatement (Third) of Property §4.13(3). See also Oak Lane Homeowners Assoc, v.
Griffin, 255 P.3d 667 (Utah 2011) (finding that the cost of maintenance of a private road
should be distributed between the dominant and servient tenements in proportion to their
relative use of the road).
In the present case, the Bennion Lateral Water Line is part of the water delivery
system that services other properties located within NFSSD's boundaries. Appellant's
Brief, 5-7. Even assuming arguendo that NFSSD had some duty of maintenance of the
Bennion Lateral Water Line after the trial court issued the Order of Immediate
Occupancy, Bennion and other "downstream" users from Bennion's property would be
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responsible for a proportionate share of any maintenance costs. However, as stated
previously, the excess water fees are just that - fees. The amounts are not damages to
Bennion5s property. Therefore, the Court should deny Bennion's claim that he is not
responsible for excess water fees from September 22, 2006 through October 2007.
POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO
AWARD NFSSD'S ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §78B5-825.
The Court should affirm the trial court's decision to award NFSSD its attorney
fees in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-825. The trial court has discretion to
determine whether matters were filed without merit and not in good faith. "It is within
the district court's discretion to determine whether matters were filed were filed without
merit and not in good faith." In re Estate ofPahl, 252 P.3d 865, 866 (Utah Ct. App.
2011) (citing Utah Dep 't ofSoc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App.
1991)). "Furthermore, 'appellate deference is owed to the trial judge who actually
presided over the proceeding and has first-hand familiarity with the litigation.'" Id.
NFSSD has been forced to pursue litigation against Bennion for several years
because Bennion simply refuses to pay any user fees, and he refused to allow NFSSD on
his property to repair any leaks in the water line. R. 198, R. 445 (8:9-11). Bennion
continues to make the same arguments that are not relevant and are moot.
The Court should uphold the trial court's award of attorney fees in this matter.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, NFSSD respectfully requests that this Court deny Mr.
Bennion's appeal in its entirety and affirm the rulings of the district court in their entirety.
DATED this

12.

day of April, 2012.
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C.
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^
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U.CA 1953 § 17B-2-8G1, U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-801

U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-801
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 17B. Limited Purpose Local Government Entities
Chapter 2. Local Districts
Part 8. Collection of Water and Sewer Service Fees (Refs & Annos)
§ 17B-2-801. Definitions

As used in this part:
(1) "Collection costs" means an amount, not to exceed $20, to reimburse a local district for expenses associated with its efforts
to collect past due service fees from a customer.
(2) "Customer" means the owner of real property to which a local district has furnished water or provided sewer service.
(3) "Damages" means an amount equal to the greater of:
(a) $100; and
(b) triple the past due service fees.
(4) "Default date" means the date on which payment for service fees becomes past due.
(5) "Past due service fees" means service fees that on or after the default date have not been paid.
(6) "Prelitigation damages" means an amount that is equal to the greater of:
(a) $50; and
(b) triple the past due service fees.
(7) "Service fees" means the amount charged by a local district to a customer for water furnished or sewer service provided
to the customer's property.

Laws 2004, c. 316, § 7, eff. May 3,2004.
Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess.
End of Document

€; 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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U . C A 1953 § 17B-2-802, U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-802

U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-802
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 17B. Limited Purpose Local Government Entities
Chapter 2. Local Districts
Part 8. Collection of Water and Sewer Sendee Fees (Refs & Annos)
§ 17B-2-802. Authority to require written application for water or sewer service a n d to terminate
for failure to pay—limitations

(1) A local district that owns or controls a system for furnishing water or providing sewer service may:
(a) before furnishing water or providing sewer service to a property, require the property owner or an authorized agent to
submit a written application, signed by the owner or an authorized agent, agreeing to pay for all water furnished or sewer
service provided to the property, whether occupied by the owner or by a tenant or other occupant, according to the rules and
regulations adopted by the local district; and
(b) if a customer fails to pay for water furnished or sewer service provided to the customer's property, discontinue furnishing
water or providing sewer service to the property, respectively, until all amounts for water furnished or sewer service provided,
respectively, are paid, subject to Subsection (2).
(2) Unless a valid lien has been established as provided in Section 17B-2-803, has not been satisfied, and has not been terminated
by a sale as provided in Subsection 17B-2-803(2), a local district may not:
(a) use a customer's failure to pay for water furnished or sewer service provided to the customer's property as a basis for
not furnishing water or providing sewer service to the property after ownership of the property is transferred to a subsequent
owner; or
(b) require an owner to pay for water that was furnished or sewer service that was provided to the property before the owner's
ownership.

Laws 2004, c. 316, § 8, eff. May 3, 2004.

fflSTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Laws:
Laws 2003, c. 161, §§3, 4.
C. 1953, §§ 10-7-10,10-7-11,17A-M03,17B-2-103.

Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess.
End of Document

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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U.CA 1953 § 17B-2-8G3, U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-803

U.C.A. 1953 § 17B-2-803
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 17B. Limited Purpose Local Government Entities
Chapter 2. Local Districts
Part 8. Collection of Water and Sewer Service Fees (Refs & Annos)
§ 17B-2-803. Lien for past due fees for water or sewer service—Limitations

(l)(a) A local district may certify past due service fees and other amounts for which the customer is liable under this chapter
to the treasurer or assessor of the county in which the customer's property is located.
(b) Subject to Subsection (2), the past due service fees and other amounts for which the customer is liable under this chapter,
upon their certification under Subsection (l)(a), become a lien on the customer's property to which the water was furnished
or sewer service provided, on a parity with and collectible at the same time and in the same manner as general county taxes
that are a lien on the property.
(2) A lien under Subsection (1) is not valid if certification under Subsection (1) is made after the filing for record of a document
conveying title of the customer's property to a new owner.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed to:
(a) waive or release the customer's obligation to pay service fees;
(b) preclude the certification of a lien under Subsection (1) with respect to past due service fees for water furnished or sewer
service provided after the date that title to the property is transferred to a new owner; or
(c) nullify or terminate a valid lien.
(4) After all amounts owing under a lien established as provided in this section have been paid, the local district shall file for
record in the county recorder's office a release of the lien.

Laws 2004, c. 316, § 9, eff. May 3,2004.
Current through the end of the 2004 4th Spec. Sess.
End of Document

Q 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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Westlaw
REST 3d PROP-SERV § 4.13
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.13 (2000)

Page 1

c
Restatement of the Law — Property
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
Current through June 2011
Copyright © 2000-2012 by the American Law Institute
Chapter 4. Interpretation Of Servitudes
§ 4.13 Duties Of Repair And Maintenance
Link to Case Citations
Unless the terms of a servitude determined under § 4.1 provide otherwise, duties to repair and maintain the
servient estate and the improvements used in the enjoyment of a servitude are as follows:
(1) The beneficiary of an easement or profit has a duty to the holder of the servient estate to repair and
maintain the portions of the servient estate and the improvements used in the enjoyment of the servitude that
are under the beneficiary's control, to the extent necessary to
(a) prevent unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of the servient estate, or
(b) avoid liability of the servient-estate owner to third parties.
(2) Except as required by § 4.9, the holder of the servient estate has no duty to the beneficiary of an easement or profit to repair or maintain the servient estate or the improvements used in the enjoyment of the
easement or profit.
(3) Joint use by the servient owner and the servitude beneficiary of improvements used in enjoyment of an
easement or profit, or of the servient estate for the purpose authorized by the easement or profit, gives rise to
an obligation to contribute jointly to the costs reasonably incurred for repair and maintenance of the portion
of the servient estate or improvements used in common.
(4) The holders of separate easements or profits who use the same improvements or portion of the servient
estate in the enjoyment of their servitudes have a duty to each other to contribute to the reasonable costs of
repair and maintenance of the improvements or portion of the servient estate.
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE DIS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT

vs

Case No: 080400633 DC

ROBERT BENNION,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

STEVEN L. HANSEN
August 25, 2008

krisv

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): KASEY L WRIGHT
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLAIRE SUMMERHILL
Audio
Tape Number:
08-24 203
Tape Count: 11:05

11:19

HEARING
TAPE: 08-24 203
COUNT: 11:05 11:19
This matter comes before the court for oral arguments. Court
addresses counsel. Ms. Summerhill responds to the court. Mr.
Wright responds. Court states the 3rd cause will be dismissed.
Ms. Summerhill continues. Mr. Wright responds.
Court will allow Ms. Summerhill 10 days to submit a final brief
and will also give Mr. Wright 10 day to submit his final brief.
Court will take the other matter under advisement. Ms. Summerhill
will prepare the order for the dismissal of Jch&. 3rd action.
Dated this 3 ^ _ day of

(DuJUy^^
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT,
DECISION
Plaintiff,

Mf

v.
ROBERT BENNION,
Defendant.

Date: September 25, 2008
Case No. 080400633
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Division 2

The matter before the court is Defendant Robert Bennion's ("Defendant") motion to •
dismiss, which was filed on May 27, 2008. Plaintiff North Fork Special Service District
("Plaintiff) filed its opposition on June 18, 2008. Defendant filed his reply on July 2, 2008,
along with a request to submit for decision and oral arguments. The court heard oral arguments
on the motion on August 25, 2008. The court rendered a partial decision, concluding that
Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages should be dismissed since no tort was alleged or pleaded
and that a four-year statute of limitations applies. However, the court took two issues under
advisement, namely whether payment of a court-awarded judgment tolled the statute of
limitations and whether section 17B-1-904 of the Utah Code, which caps damages for service
fees to $200 for a residential property, is applicable in this case since it became operative on May
5, 2008.
In its supplemental memorandum, Plaintiff concedes that the four-year statute of
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limitations was not tolled by Defendant's payment of the court-awarded judgment and that any
claims accruing prior to February 29, 2004 are therefore barred by the statute of limitations. In
addition, both parties requested attorney fees in their supplemental memoranda in connection
with litigating the motion to dismiss. As a result of the supplemental briefing, the issues before
the court are whether section 17B-1-904 applies to limit Plaintiffs damages for service fees to
$200 and whether either party should be awarded attorney fees. The court now renders this
decision and concludes that section 17B-1-904 does not apply to limit Plaintiffs damages to
$200. Additionally, the court declines to award attorney fees to either party.
As noted by Plaintiff, section 68-3-3 of the Utah Code codifies the principle that statutes
are not applicable retroactively unless the legislature clearly expresses that intention. Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-3 (2008). The Utah Supreme Court explained that "[t]he best evidence of the
legislature's intent is the plain meaning of the statute." Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of the
Utah State Tax Comm % 922 P.2d 758, 767 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). In determining
whether a particular statute was to be applied retroactively, the court stated that because the
statute "contained] no language reflecting an intent that this subsection should apply
retroactively, we conclude that the legislature had no such intent.'' Id.

- -

Similarly, the plain language of section 17D-1-106, which made section 17B-1-904
applicable to special service districts as of May 5, 2008, does not contain any language reflecting
an intent on the part of the legislature that it should apply retroactively. Although, as noted by
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Defendant, section 17B-1-904 was enacted in 2004, it did not apply to special service districts
until May 5, 2008 when section 17D-1-106 was enacted, which was approximately two months
after the case was filed by Plaintiff. In the absence of language in the statute showing an intent
on the part of the legislature that section 17D-1-106 should apply retroactively to make 17B-1904 and other sections applicable to special service districts, the court declines to apply it
retroactively to cap Plaintiffs service fee damages to $200.
Because section 17B-1-904 of the Utah Code is not applicable retroactively, the court
finds that section 17A-2-1320 applies in this case. Section 17A-2-1320, which was repealed
May 5,2008 when 17B-1-904 became effective, authorized a special service district to pass a
resolution or ordinance imposing fees or charges for services provided by the district. Utah Code
Ann. § 17A-2-1320(l)(a) (2007) (repealed 2008). In addition, it enabled a district to adopt rules
to assure the proper collection of all fees and charges, as well as allowing for the assessment and
collection of penalties and interest if fees were not paid. Id. at § 17A-2-1320(2)(a) and (b).
Although section 17A-2-1320 was repealed and replaced by 17B-1-904, section 68-3-5 of
the Utah Code operates to preserve any right accrued by Plaintiff pursuant to section 17A-21320. Section 68-3-5 states, "The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously
repealed, or affect any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any
action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed." Utah Code Ann. §
68-3-5 (2008). Because the fees and charges imposed by Plaintiff on Defendant were already
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accrued by the time the statute was repealed, section 68-3-5 works to make section 17A-2-1320
applicable in this case.
Both parties requested attorney fees in connection with bringing this motion. The court
declines to award attorney fees to either party.
In conclusion, the court finds that section 17B-1-904 is not made applicable retroactively
by section 17D-1-106 and that section 17A-2-1320 is therefore applicable in this case. Plaintiff
has stipulated that the four-year statute of limitations was not tolled by Defendant paying the
judgment imposed by the court in a prior case. The court declines to award attorney fees to either
party in connection with this motion. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare appropriate proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order consistent with this decision for signature by
the Court.
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE C O U R T :

4

MS. MELLOR:

5

THE C O U R T :

6

I t ' s N o r t h Fork S p e c i a l

7

Be nn i on .

8
9
10

Good m o r n i n g , Your
Okay,.

Let me call the c a s e .

S e r v i c e D i s t r i c t vs

MS. MELLOR:

and
record,

M e l i s s a M e l l o r on b e h a l f

the p l a i n t i f f , N o r t h Fork S p e c i a l
MR. B E N N I O N :

Service

of

District.

R o b e r t B e n n i o n on b e h a l f of

himself.
THE COURT:

Okay,,

The matters before

16

C o u r t this m o r n i n g are p e n d i n g m o t i o n s .

17

plaintiff

18

and the a f f i d a v i t s

19

m o t i o n for s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t

20

of the d e f e n d a n t ' s

21

for s u m m a r y

has filed

a motion

the

The

to s t r i k e the

in s u p p o r t of the

responses

plaintiff's

•• - e x c u s e m e , in

support

r e s p o n s e to the p l a i n t i f f ' s

motion

judgment.

22

MS. MELLOR:

23

THE COURT:

25

Robert

please.

15

24

Honor.

p a r t i c i p a t e p l e a s e s t a t e y o u r n a m e s for the

13
14

morning.

T h o s e w h o are g o i n g to a p p e a r

11
12

Good

b e f o r e the C o u r t
And

That's

correct.

So we have t h o s e two

motions

today.
so go a h e a d , M s . M e l l o r , you may
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CitiCourt,
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proceed.
MS. MELLOR:

Thank you.

I believe

the

motion to strike that's been filed on behalf of the
plaintiff details specifically which portions we're
seeking to strike.

The reason that we're doing

that

is we find that they're either not relevant, they're
based on inadmissible hearsay, they're not properly
cited to in the defendant's opposition

memorandum.

For example, many of the responses to the plaintiff's
asserted facts just contain argument and they don't
have any relevant cite.

They're not cited to even an

affidavit or anything like that.

And so in our

memorandum in support of our motion to strike

those

portions, we detailed which ones specifically

we

would be seeking to strike, and that would be the
basi s for that.

'

We're also seeking to strike the
defendant's affidavit that was filed in support of
the defendant's opposition memo.

The reason we're

seeking to strike that is, one, it was dated
2005.

Since that time, Your Honor, there's

from
already

been a collection case involving these same two
parties for disputed fees and excess water fees prior
to the dates in question in this case.
that affidavit where it's merely

And to allow

restating
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something

5
from a case that was completely adjudicated

through a

t r i a l , we would seek to strike that on that basis.
The other thing is that the defendant's
opposition memorandum contains a purported,
undisputed fact in their argument section as well as
Exhibit F to their opposition memorandum.

This is

referencing Dr. Pamela V i n c e n t , who was a former
neighbor of Mr. B e n n i o n ' s , a downhill water user.
Just to provide some brief history, if the
Court would like that.

The prior court case, which

went to trial, it was determined that the plaintiff
is responsible for maintenance of main water
Just like most h o m e o w n e r s , they are then

lines.

responsible

for the lateral water lines and sewer lines that come
off of that.

You know, if something happens in the

lateral water line at my house, I'm responsible for
that.

If it's the main line then, you know, the

sewer company is going to take care of that.
When we were at the prior trial, it was
determined

-- the C o u r t , for sake of just making it

more simple in reference, named it the Bennion
lateral water line.

And so you have this main water

line and then coming off of that would be this
Bennion lateral water line.

There have been ongoing

disputes about whether or not North Fork could even
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CitiCourt,
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6
put meters on that or anything.
W e l l , the downhill user from that was Dr.
Vincent.

Now, she was involved with a lawsuit

to North Fork being involved

in anything, and that

predates even our prior collection
was resolved

prior

case.

That matter

and the Court ruled in that case, from

what I know, is that, y e s , she's allowed to hook up
to this water line.

So the meters have been put in

place coming off the main water meter and then where
it goes to the Pamela Vincent

property.

Dr. Stott, in the prior trial, determined,
well, any water that's used, whether or not it's
being actually used or caused by leaks, is the
responsibility of Mr. Bennion.

And part of what came

out at that trial was that he refused to allow North
Fork to service this part of the water line.

They

were willing to do that in an effort to find any
leaks and, you know, take care of any of that.
So we're seeking to strike the information
relating to Dr. Vincent because we don't believe it's
relevant to this case, because this is really just a
simple collection case for base user fees as well as
the excess water usage

fees.

The last thing that we were seeking to
strike is part of the argument in sections 1 and 2 of

CitiCourt,
LLCLaw School, BYU.
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1

the defendant's opposition memorandum, because it's

2

our position that this was already adjudicated by

3

this Court earlier on in this case.

4

plaintiff had filed and served

5

defendant filed a motion to dismiss and we briefed

6

that, and there were even supplemental

7

associated with that.

8

regarding what statute of limitations and everything

9

was applicable.

Where after the

its complaint, the

briefs

And then the decision was made

So do.bring it up again in this --

10

you know, in the context of a motion for summary

11

judgment we believe

12

that should be stricken.

13
14

is inappropriate, and that's why

So those are the arguments as to why we
want to strike those particular

15

things.

Regarding the plaintiff's motion for

16

summary

17

we believe this is all subject to res judicata.

18

has been completely

19

judgment, as has been said, you know,

"

really

adjudicated.

O n e , is North Fork duly authorized

20

a special

service district?

21

statute, we have adjudicated

22

previously.

23

This

to have

It's permitted by
that issue as well

Are they allowed to charge base user fees?

24

Y e s , they're allowed

25

adjudicated.

by statute, also

previously
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1

Are they allowed to charge for excess

2

water usage fees?

3

schedule by the N o r t h - F o r k b o a r d

4

Y e s , they are.

They set the
of directors.

Are they allowed to charge interest?

5

they are.

6

issues of material fact.

7

charge these amounts and they're entitled

8

on

Yes,

As a matter of law there are no genuine
North Fork is entitled

to

to collect

them.

9

I mean, this has been ongoing for

several

10

years.

11

doesn't need to pay for these.

12

district's position that everyone needs to pay for

13

these services.

14

garbage collection, and fire protection

15

Those are included

in the base fees.

16

have the graduated

scale for the other fees, which

17

have been provided

in the pleadings.

18

Mr. Bennion holds the position that he
And it's the

And they do provide water and sewer,
services.

And then they

Now, I'm going to anticipate that there

19

will be an argument that, well, we don't have to pay

20

-- you know, he doesn't need to pay that much --

21

w e l l , I'm assuming he doesn't believe he needs to pay

22

for any, but even regarding the excess water

23

fees.

You know, there's been talk in these

24

pleadings about how we sought injunctive

25

essentially, to gain access to this pipe because,
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relief,

9

literally, millions of gallons of water were being
lost and that's such a precious resource.
that is what happened

And so

a few years ago.

But where the actual order of

immediate

occupancy was granted, this was after we filed

for

this, then there was an appeal, then the rejection of
the appeal, also a motion to reconsider was all
involved

in that.

So by the time -- after we sought

for the injunctive relief until we were able to get
it was September 28th, 2007.
Now, you would notice in the declaration
of Mr. Boshard, who is the director of services for
North Fork, in his -- I believe it is dated May 17th
of last year, that you notice how these water
were getting so large per quarter.

fees

Once we did

obtain that injunctive relief, how it was going down
dramatically, because North Fork was able to then go
in, without possible threat by Mr. Bennion, because
there had been prior threats, threats of violence,
actually.

And so once the Court order was in place

and the appellate procedure regarding that to that
point had been exhausted, they went in and did

that

and now it's -- you know, the pipe there, in
question,

isfunctioning.
So based upon that, the plaintiff
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assert that, one, they're entitled
rates; that, two, Mr. Bennion

to. charge

is required

base user fee, and that it's already been

to pay the
adjudicated

that he's responsible for the excess water
fees, and that he should be ordered

these

usage

to pay those as

well, with interest, and that the Court also award
reasonable attorney's fees in this matter.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr.Bennion.
MR. BENNION:
of contracts, and I'll

First I'll

address the issue

address the issue of fraud.

And then, first of all, I'll

have to address

issue of the duty of counsel

to tell the truth.

There is a duty of counsel to be forthright
forthcoming

the

and

in front of the Court.
This is a government agency.

government agency.

The government agency

This is a
has

infinite money to harass anybody that they wish to
harass, and they have done so.

They have done so

constantly.
We start with the fact that in 1994 the
North Fork Special Service District connected
lateral without my permission.

And there's

-- there is an interesting bit of law that
counsel is ignoring.

And the interesting
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definite
this

bit of law

11

is nuisance per se.

If she contends at any moment --

if she contends at any moment that the connection to
Pamela Vincent was not a nuisance per se, she will be
committing

perjury.
Now, there's specific laws about

per se.

nuisance

Even if -- even if the work is done with

absolute perfection and it doesn't meet the standards
of law, even though it performs perfectly and it
doesn't meet the standards of law, then it is a
nuisance per se.
The zoning ordinance requires for -- first
of all, if this counsel denies that Pamela
was in a recreational

Vincent

resort and had duties to the

contract pertinent to the recreational

resort, she

will be lying, she will be committing perjury, and
she will be obstructing

justice.

The water system -- the water system for
recreational

resorts require water mains in the

culinary fire protection

system supplying hydrants,

dwellings, and any irrigation needs, shall be sized
according to an engineering

study to adequately

supply those uses, but in no case shall they be less
than six inches in diameter and no less than eight
inches in diameter of supplying a fire hydrant on a
dead-end

run longer than 400 feet in length.
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Now, if she contends for one moment
Pamela Vincent was being served, that my water

that
line

that was serving her was eight inches in diameter
when it entered

the recreational

resort

property,

then she will be lying, she will be committing
perjury.
She has not been forthcoming.

She has

been gaining -- she has been gaining money for
harassing m e , for stealing my property, and
destroying

it as evidence.

She has not -- neither

she, or the water district, or Pamela Vincent
paid me for my water line, never offered
for my water line.

ever

to pay me

And it was illegal for Pamela

Vi ncent to use it.
Pamela Vincent -- Pamela Vincent
recreational

resort.

is in a

The people in a recreational

resort have to sign a contract that they'll obey the
maintenance and preservation

agreement.

Now, the interesting
maintenance and preservation
MS. MELLOR:

part of the

agreement is --

Your Honor, I'm going to

object, it's -- this -MR. BENNION:

I object.

You stop.
THE COURT:

Just a minute.
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Let her finish

13
her objection.
MS. MELLOR:
beyond

the scope.

I'm going to o b j e c t , this is

One, it's beyond

the scope of what

the two motions before the Court are.
matter has already been adjudicated

Two, this

regarding hook up

to Pamela Vincent in a lawsuit between Dr. Vincent
and Mr. Bennion, that North Fork is not a part of.
That's not the issue before the Court.
MR. BENNION:
THE COURT:
MR. BENNION:

The issue -Thank you.
-- it's entirely

because this is a matter of fraud.

resolved

This is a matter

of fraud .
THE COURT:
MR. BENNION:

All

right.

She contends that the North

Fork Special Service District has been using a proper
system to deliver me water.

In reality, it was a

nuisance per se and a dangerous nuisance in and of
itself.

At one point during their service

bathtub full of mud because of their
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I had a

construction.
The objection

is

overruled.
You may continue.
minutes to go.

You have about ten

Okay?

MR. BENNION:

Pamela Vincent
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-- and I read

1

this -- this is the contract that Pamela Vincent has

2

to obey and it is a contract which the North

3

Special Service District agreed to.

4

agree to it.

5

;

6

object, this isn't into evidence.

7

this.

They had to

And it says --

MS. MELLOR:

Your Honor, I'm going to
I haven't

MR. BENNION:

You have the obligation to

know every bit of what has been going on.

10

THE COURT:

The objection

is overruled.

11

;

12

just admonish you not to raise your voice --

You may continue, Mr. Bennion, but I would

13

MR. BENNION:

14

THE COURT:

15

seen

I don't even -- I'm not sure what --

8
9

Fork

against the attorney.

16

-- or make personal

insults

Okay?

. MR. BENNION:
resort.

Sorry.

Pamela Vincent is within a

17

recreational

The North Fork Special

Service

18

District has been violating the law which does not

19

allow public employees to give people

20

permission to violate the law.

21

of January in 1 9 9 5 , they connected

22

line without my permission, and in violation of the

23

zoning ordinance and in violation of the covenants

24

that Pamela Vincent signed when she went into the

25

ordinance

special

When, in the middle
up to my water

-- and she knows, she knows that there was
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a c o n t r a c t , she knows that there was an ordinance,
and she knows that they were in a subdivision.

She

has not been forthright to this Court that the North
Fork Special Service District - Now, the other thing is -- the main
thing is is just yesterday
the developer

other

-- w e l l , the main thing is

-- the developer of the resort has to

provide a water system.
Service District

The North Fork

Special

has been covering up the fact that

Robert Redford did n o t , did not build a water
before he sold plat -- property
T h e y ' r e covering

system

in that plat.

it up, they've been covering

it up

for 15 years.
And they've sent me bills for water
I told them to stop using my water line.

They

after
could

have run a hose or another pipeline all during

this

period.

Fork

There was a water line from the North

Special Service District

right in front of her house,

about 50 feet away, and they could have attached a
pump.

But instead, they decided, with their

heavy

duty money, to use my line, which was a felony -which was a felony and was also a violation of a
nuisance per se including being an actual
and a hazard to the people's

nuisance

health.

All the time the water was leaking, any
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public engineer would tell y o u , a water line that has
leaks is highly

hazardous for c o n t a m i n a t i o n .

And I

have mud in my bathtub because of their operation.
And they never cleaned it out.

And it's just -- it's

just their willingness to spend a lot of public money
to hide the fact that Pamela Vincent and the North -and the Sundance Recreational Resort's plats D and B
did not do their job.

And they want to hide the fact

that they were in violation of theft of my property.
What they are doing -- what they were doing with my
property is specified

as theft by extortion.

If they had water leaks, they
have had let them run for 15 y e a r s .

shouldn't

They had any --

a water -- a plain water hose going down to Pamela
Vincent would be more in conjecture with the law than
using my water line.
Now, somewhere here I have an envelope
from the water d i s t r i c t , which I have not opened, and
it's similar to other notices.
what it says there:

It's in 1995. And

If you don't pay your water

bill, we're going to turn off your water line.

Well,

they -- at that point they had been using my water
line to serve Pamela Vincent in a fraudulent
recreational

resort for two, three y e a r s .
And I was perfectly willing for them to
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shut off my water.

Instead of shutting off my water

and building a non leaking system, they forced
into the line.

water

I told them several times to turn it

off and do something different.

They had

another

right-of-way which they could have easily used, but
they chose to harass me for 15 years by using my
water line and pretending that it was not a nuisance
per se.

It's abs-- and pretending that it wasn't

felony theft by extortion to use my property

for

somebody else.
THE COURT:

You have five more m i n u t e s ,

sir.
MR. BENNION:

Thank you.

I appreciate it,

The zoning ordinance requires that water
be delivered and that it be delivered

in certain

amounts to the p r o p e r t i e s , and the purpose up in that
area to have that water delivered.

And the zoning

ordinance requires that it be delivered at no cost to
the people in the d e v e l o p m e n t s .
Now, their -- the North Fork Special
Service District has been persecuting me because I
pointed out -- I pointed out that in 1995 Dave
Boshard

and Rodney Despain, of the North Fork

Service District, took money out of the water

Special
tank

fund, which was a felony in and of itself, and then
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they started

billing people for water which

people own, because the developer

the

is required

the water to the people at no charge.

And the

they're supposed

they're

supposed

to do that is because

to give
reason

to protect the fire -- the area from fire,

irrigate the ground

so that weeds don't grow and

that

natural vegetation can grow, and this is specified
clearly

in the zoning o r d i n a n c e , and the water

demands have become higher.

When the North

Fork

Special Service District charges money for w a t e r ,
they are counteracting

the clear intent of the zoning

ordinance.
Now, just yesterday

I found this deed.

It's a deed to the -- it's a deed to the first
of Pamela Vincent's property.

All of -- and it's a

quit claim deed from the d e v e l o p m e n t ,
Recreational

Resort plat B.

with water rights appurtenant

owners

Sundance

And it says:

Together

to, or now used with

sai d property.
When Vincent -- Vincent was one of three
properties that were previously
included

subdivided

in Sundance Recreational

they had water

rights.

and

Resort plat B, and

My -- the previous owner of

my property bought water rights at the same time.
And I -- and on the plat map it says that these three
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1

properties were able to take their water rights into

2

the development.

3

And this deed clearly illustrates

that

4

they had a water right which they bought from the

5

North Fork Special Service District, and they used it

6

unhesitantly, without any charge, until the water

7

tank fund got depleted by illegal spending by Dave

8

Boshard and Rodney Despain.

9

they owned the water and they could steal it. The

And then they decided

10

zoning ordinance clearly states that the water

11

belong to the property and not to the North Fork

12

Special Service District.

13

And I have water rights.

rights

And so any -- I

14

had water rights when I was there associated with my

15

property.

16

about, who knows,..4 acre feet every year.

17

money that they charged before I used more than .4

18

acre feet was extortion.

19

they made me -- because they made me operate -- at no

20

time could I cooperate with the water district in

21

supplying water to Pamela Vincent because it would

22

have been a felony for me to induce the North

23

Special Service District to serve Pamela V i n c e n t .

24
25

The same water rights here, which was
And any

And besides that, because

So they haven't been forthcoming,
been violating the law all along.

They're
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Fork

they've

violating

20
the law this very moment because they actually
my water line away from me.

took

There was no judge that

ever said that they could use the substandard

water

line, a water line which was not built by the
developers of the North Fork -- of the Sundance
Recreational

Resort's plat B and plat D.
I have more to say, but you gave me five.
THE COURT:

W e l l , I only scheduled a half

an hour for this hearing.

I divided the time up

equally between both sides and the plaintiff
entitled to have the last word.*

is

So you used your

time as you thought it was appropriate.
So counsel, do you have anything in
response?
MS. MELLOR:
respond

Your Honor, rather than to

to a lot of those 1 accusations, is there any

specific questions that you would have for me
regarding

anything?
THE C O U R T :
MS. MELLOR:

No.
Otherwise

I believe it would

be appropriate to submit off of argument
THE COURT:

Okay.

(inaudible).

W e l l , thank you.

W e l l , Mr. Bennion, I have listened
carefully

to your arguments today and they're very

impassioned, you've been very persuasive and
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1

you've --

2

MR. BENNION:

3

THE COURT:

4

May I say one more thing?
Yes, sir, uh-huh

(affirmative).

5

MR. BENNION:

The reason I discharged my

6

attorney is because she conducted hearings in secret

7

without notifying me, and I'd expressly told her for

8

- - s o anything that happened on this case in recent

9

months was without my permission, without my

10

knowledge, and is suspect, entirely suspect.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you, sir.

12

All right.

Well, you've talked a lot

13

about the merits of the case and you've argued

14

issues, as counsel has pointed out, have been argued

15

before.

16

morni ng - -

And I allowed you a lot of leeway here this

17

MR. BENNION:

18

THE COURT:

Thank you.
-- because you're representing

19

yourself and not -- and that you're not a member of

20

the bar.

21

yourself.

22

today and they have to do with the rules of civil

23

procedure.

24
25

So I wanted you to be able to express
But you've got a couple of problems here

There are arguments that are stated in the
briefs and in the memorandums and in the responses
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which are not appropriate and that should

be stricken

because of the rules of procedure.
And I agree with the plaintiff
the motion to strike the portions of
memorandum

and

grant

defendant's

in opposition to the plaintiff's

for summary judgment, Exhibit A, which

motion

is your

a f f i d a v i t , as well as Exhibit F, excerpts from
Vincent's deposition.

And specifically , that

pleadings that have been stated are not

Pamela
those

consistent

with the rules 7(c) and 3 ( b ) , the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, regarding these

affidavits.

The rule says the opposing party

shall

provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute
supported

by citation

to relevant m a t e r i a l s , such as

affidavits or discovery m a t e r i a l s .

And the

to the plaintiff's statement of undisputed
unsupported

responses
facts are

by citation to the relevant materials.

And in contrast, plaintiff

supports its fact with

affidavits and declarations of David

Boshard,

director of services for North Fork, as well as
Rochelle A n d e r s o n , the district clerk, as well as the
findings of fact and conclusions of law that are
presented

in support of the plaintiff's

arguments by

Judge Stott and his decision signed November
2008.
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1

•

So I do find that the responses are

2

deficient because you've denied these facts without

3

citing materials.

4

responses as outlined

5

And therefore, I strike those
in the motion.

As well as -- I acknowledge that

6

inadmissible evidence cannot be considered

in ruling

7

on a motion for summary judgment, so an affidavit

8

which does not purport to meet the requirements of

9

Rule 5 6 ( e ) , Mr. Bennion, must be subject to a motion

10

to strike as well.

11

cited by Ms. Mellor as well.

12

points out that those affidavits merely reflect the

13

affidavits with unsubstantiated conclusions that fail

14

to state any evidentiary basis of facts that are

15

insufficient to create issues of material fact.

16

And that's supported by case law
And she correctly

I also agree with the plaint iff on her

17

motion to strike your affidavit, attached

18

Exhibit A, because the assertions there lack any

19

foundation or conclusory and are moot as w e l l ,

20

they have been decided by Judge Stott in the prior

21

case.

22

as

since

And then I strike the reference to

23

deposition of Pamela Vincent because in the previous

24

litigation she was deemed legally entitled to connect

25

to the Bennion lateral water line.

I know you
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vehemently disagree with that, Mr. Bennion, however,
that has been previously litigated.

And so her

deposition taken in anticipation of other
has already settled that issue.
today and it's now moot.

It's

litigation

irrelevant

And so those are the basis

for striking the affi davit.
Now, there's a motion for summary
before me today.

judgment

And pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Bennion, a party
is entitled

to summary judgment, if what I have

before m e , in the form of pleadings of a f f i d a v i t s ,
show there's no genuine issue as a material
then the moving party is entitled
matter of law.

fact,

to judgment as a

And the moving party, which would be

the plaintiff here, has that burden of

presenting

evidence that no genuine issue of material

fact

exists.
Pursuant to that standard, Mr. Bennion,
I'm

determining this morning that the plaintiff

entitled

is

to judgment as a matter of law in the

amounts owed for the services, the base user

fees,

the excess water user fees, the interest and the
reasonable attorney's fee.
No genuine issue of material fact has been
presented

that the plaintiff provided services to
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you.

That plaintiff's assertion

is supported

by

declarations and the findings of fact as I've
There are no genuine issues of

stated.

material

fact about the leaks on the defendant's lateral
line.

Judge Stott, in his findings of fact

conclusions of law, already determined
defendant

and

that

is responsible for maintaining

water

the

his

lateral

water line, whether or not he uses the w a t e r .
Ms. Mellor pointed

that out and she's correct

this

morning.
There are no genuine issues of
fact regarding the damages asserted

by the

material
plaintiff

and the plaintiff has proved the damages by

offering

invoice for the defendant's base user fees and

the

excess water use.
Defendant was made aware of the

graduated

scale charges for excess water use during the

earlier

trial and defendant denies the plaintiff's

assertions

regarding

supported

documents.

that without any citation

to any

So the defendant is responsible for the

leaking and the excess water usage along the
lateral water line as cited

Bennion

in that previous case by

J u d g e S t o 11.
So in conclusion, then, the motion
strike is granted

and the plaintiff's motion
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1

summary judgment is granted.

2

Anything further?

3

MS. MELLOR:

Your Honor, I would just -- I

4

have information -- Mr. Bennion has provided that he

5

is living in Nevada.

6

Court and myself an updated address.

7

If he would just provide the

THE COURT:

Mr. Bennion, that's necessary.

8

You are representing yourself in the case and when

9

you come into court and provide yourself to the

10

Court, I think it's important that you let us know so

11

we can send you pleadings, and you keep a current

12

address with the Court on file.

13

address, sir?

14
15

MR. BENNION:

Yes.

So do you have an

3220 Mariner Bay

Street, Las Vegas, Nevada.

16

THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.

17

Ms. Mellor, ifyou'll prepare an

18

appropriate pleading representing the decision of the

19

Court as well as marshalling any other reference to

20

your affidavit of law and argument to support the

21

decision of the Court.

22
23

Thank you.

MS. MELLOR:

Thank you.

(Court adjourned at 11:41 a.m.)

24
25
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REPORTER'S

1

CERTIFICATE

2
3

STATE OF UTAH

4

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss .
5
6

I, Robin Conk, Registered
Reporter, do hereby certify:

Professional

7
8

That on November 2 8 , 2 0 1 1 , I produced a
transcript from electronic media at the request of
Brady T. Gibbs;

9
10
11
12

That the testimony of all speakers was
reported in stenotype and thereafter transcribed, and
that a f u l l , true, and correct transcription of said
testimony is set forth in the preceding p a g e s ,
according to my ability to hear and understand the
tape provided;

13
14
15
16

That the original transcript was sealed
and delivered to Brady T. Gibbs for s a f e k e e p i n g .
I further certify that I am not kin or
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said
cause of action and that I am not interested in the
outcome thereof.

17
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CERTIFIED this 28th day of N o v e m b e r , 2011
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Robin Conk, RPR
23
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Kasey L. Wright, Bar No. 9169
Melissa K. Mellor, Bar No. 10437
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd., Ste. 202
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801)443-2380
Facsimile: (801) 796-0984
e-mail: mmellor@centralutahlaw.com

of Utah County, State of Utan

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ROBERT BENNION,
Defendant.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE PORTIONS OF (I)
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
(II) EXHIBIT "A" TO DEFENDANT'S
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM ROBERT BENNION'S AFFIDAVIT, AND
(HI) EXHD3T "F" TO DEFENDANT'S
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM EXCERPTS FROM PAMELA
VINCENT'S DEPOSITION
Case No. 080400633
Judge Steven L. Hansen

On June 8,2011, the Court heard argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. At the
hearing, Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, Melissa K. Mellor, of HANSEN WRIGHT
EDDY & HAWS, P.C, and Defendant was pro se.
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The Court heard the arguments made on behalf of the parties, reviewed the applicable
pleadings and file therein, and being fully advised in the premises, now therefore, ORDERS,
ADJUDGES AND DECREES as
1.

follows:

•

The Court finds that statements in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Opposition Memo") contain statements
that constitute inadmissible hearsay and/or lack proper foundation and support.
2.

The Court finds that the statements identified herein fail to adhere to the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure. If a party opposing a motion for summary judgment controverts
specific facts asserted by the movant, "the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the
grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials." Utah R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(B).
3.

.

:

,,.. ' ,

Moreover, "inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.. .so an afEdavit which does not meet the requirements of rule 56(e) maybe
subject to a motion to strike." GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164 (Utah App.
1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
4.

The Court strikes the Defendant's following responses to Plaintiffs Memorandum

in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Statement of Material Uncontested Facts"
section) in Defendant's Opposition Memo because such responses are not supported by citation
to any relevant materials:
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"Defendant denies that all property owners located within the special service district
boundaries are required to pay a monthly base fee for services. Defendant asserts that
property owners may "opt out" of garbage collection services if they do not make use
of these services. Defendant also asserts that property owners who do not receive
water services from Plaintiff (i.e. in the instance their water service had been
discontinued for non-payment or other reasons) are not required to pay a monthly
base fee for services. Defendant farther asserts that for many of the properties within
Plaintiffs boundaries, a water share is attached to the property and is owned by the
property owners, and that therefore Plaintiffs [sic] are charging property owners for
water actually already owned by those owners." (Defendant's Opposition Memo,
Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 2, pp. 3-4).
"However, Defendant asserts that questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff has
the authority to establish such additional fees and penalties, and whether such
additional fees and penalties are fair, reasonable, and justified." (Defendant's
Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiff's Fact No. 3, p. 4).
"Defendant asserts that questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff is authorized to
charge excess water usage fees to members who use more than 5,000 gallons during
one month. A bald assertion by one of Plaintiffs employees that Plaintiff is
authorized to take a certain action does not make that authorization a fact. Defendant
further asserts that questions of fact exist with respect to requirements that property
owners within Plaintiff's boundaries use a specified amount of water on their
property during dry periods in order to protect the canyon from fires, and whether
Plaintiff is justified for charging property owners who seek to fulfill these
requirements." (Defendant's Opposition M^emo, Response to Plaintiff's Fact No. 4,
pp. 4-5).
"Defendant had shut off the water to his cabin after Plaintiff had contaminated the
line, and had specifically asked, on numerous occasions to have his water service
discontinued. Plaintiff had both actual and constructive notice that Defendant did not
wish to receive water services. Plaintiff voluntarily chose not to shut off the water to
Defendant's cabin at the location where the lateral connected to the main because
Plaintiff was using Defendant's lateral, despite its not meeting legal requirements for
more than one customer, and without Defendant's consent or permission, to deliver
water to other customers." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiff's
Fact No. 6, p. 5). [Defendant references his affidavit, but his affidavit does not assert
the afore-listed allegations.]

3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(e)

"Neither Defendant nor his counsel have received any bills since that time."
(Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 8, p. 6). [No
supporting documentation or affidavit that Defendant did not receive any invoices or
bills since August 23, 2008].

(f)

"Defendant denies that he has never voluntarily paid for services provided by
Plaintiff. Each year while he owned the property, Defendant voluntarily paid his tax
bill when it was received, and a significant portion of this revenue is paid to Plaintiff
for the maintenance and upkeep of the water system. Material questions of fact exist
as to whether services were provided, and if services were provided, the amount
owed for those services." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs
Fact No. 9, p. 6).

(g)

"Defendant asserts that material questions of fact exist as to whether he is liable (and
therefore possibly delinquent) for 'sanitation services' when he had opted out of
garbage collection service and did not make use of this service. Defendant also
asserts that material questions of fact exist as to whether he is liable for 'access to
water... services' when Plaintiff was on notice, based on the proceedings in Fourth
District Case No. 040401235 that he did not wish to receive such services."
(Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 11, p. 7).'

(h)

"However, in this particular case, a material issue of fact exists as to who was
responsible for maintaining the line in question. One property owner constructed an
extension to Defendant's lateral line to provide water to his property. Another
property owner, after the developer of her property failed to construct a required
water system, connected to this extension. Plaintiff then used Defendant's lateral and
these extensions to the lateral to provide water to the two additional property owners.
Material questions of fact exist as to who was responsible for maintaining the section
of the lateral providing water to these additional property owners: Plaintiff,
Defendant, the two property owners, or the Developer who failed to construct the
required water system in thefirstplace, making it necessary for at least one resident
of the recreational resort to tap into Defendant's lateral to obtain water."
' (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 14, pp. 8-9).

(i)

"However, Defendant asserts that material questions of fact exist as the
responsibilities associated with that ownership in that he had been denied control of
the lateral." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 15, p.
9).
4
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(j)

'The question of whether Defendant is responsible for the water which Plaintiff and
others caused or allowed to leakfromthe line during a time period when he did not
wish any water services and was denied the right to turn off the water is the primary
question at issue in this lawsuit." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to
Plaintiffs Fact No. 16, p. 9).

(k)

"[W]hen it appeared Plaintiffs employees or representatives were preparing to dig
near a gas line without previously acquiring information on the location of the gas
line." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs Fact No. 17, p. 10).

(1)

"Defendant asserts that material questions of fact exist as to why Plaintiff initiated a
condemnation action to obtain an easement across his property to build a water line
into Sundance Recreational Resort Plat B. Defendant further asserts that "why" is
rarely, if ever, a statement of fact, as a 'fact' is something that can be given a date and
time, not a justification or explanation, 'after the fact' of why someone took or failed
to take a particular action." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to Plaintiffs
Fact No. 19, p. 11).

(m)

"Material issues of fact exist as to how the amount of the charges was calculated. No
formula or schedules were provided showing how charges were calculated.
Defendant asserts that as a matter of law, he should not be found liable for the cost of
any water passing through the line after the date Plaintiff was granted immediate
occupancy in the condemnation action." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response
to Plaintiffs Fact No. 21, p. 12).

(n)

"Defendant denies that he is delinquent in paying for any water usage. Whether he
owes for excess water, and if so, how much, is the issue in dispute. As indicated in
Defendant's responses to Plaintiffs previous statements of fact, many issues of
material fact exist as to whether Plaintiff provided any services to Defendant, how
much water passed through the line, who was responsible for the maintenance and
repair of the line, whether Plaintiff could or should have taken action to repair the
line it had taken possession of for its own benefit, and who was responsible for the
water passing through the line." (Defendant's Opposition Memo, Response to
Plaintiffs Fact No. 22, pp. 12-13).

5.

A court may strike affidavits in which the asserted facts are not based on personal

knowledge, lack foundation, are conclusory, or contain heairsay. Murdoch v. Springville Mun.
5 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Corp., 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999). Moreover, an affidavit that merely reflects the affidavit's
unsubstantiated conclusions and that fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an
issue of fact. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985).
6.

The Court hereby strikes Defendant's 2005 affidavit attached as Exhibit "A" to

Defendant's Opposition Memo because his assertions lack foundation, are conclusory, and are
irrelevant to the present action.
7.

The Court hereby strikes Paragraph 4 of Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts

and Exhibit "F" to Defendant's Opposition Memo for lack of foundation, conclusory statements, and
inadmissible hearsay.
8.

The Court hereby strikes Defendant's argument in Defendant's Opposition Memo

regarding jurisdiction and alleged notice requirements (Sections I and II of Defendant's argument
section of his Opposition Memo, pages 16-18), since this matter has already been adjudicated in
a decision made by this Court dated October 1, 2008.
DATED this

ffiflayof

$ A

> 2011 •

t

BYTHECOIRT^O^

Fourth JudicfU

.^^.^

Approved as to form:

ROBERT F. BENNION, Pro Se Defendant
6
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF (I) DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, (II) EXHIBIT "A" TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM ROBERT BENNION'S AFFIDAVIT, AND (HI) EXHEBT "F" TO DEFENDANT'S
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM - EXCERPTS FROM PAMELA VINCENT'S
DEPOSITION, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this

day of October, 2011, to the

following:
Robert F. Bennion
3220 Mariner Bay Street
Las Vegas, NV 89117
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE
To:

Robert F. Bennion
3220 Mariner Bay Street
Las Vegas, NV 89117

Re:

North Fork Special Service District v. Robert Bennion.
Case No. 080400633
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Plaintiff will submit the above and

foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF (I)
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (II) EXHIBIT "A" TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION
MEMORANDUM - ROBERT BENNION'S AFFIDAVIT, AND (III) EXHIBT "F" TO
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM - EXCERPTS FROM PAMELA
VINCENT'S DEPOSITION, to the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, Utah
for signature -upon the expiration offive(5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days
for mailing, unless written objection isfiledprior to that time pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this g r ^ - day of October, 2011.
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C.

Attorney for Plaintiff
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FILED

Kasey L. Wright, Bar No. 9169
Melissa K. Mellor, Bar No. 10437
HANSEN, WRIGHT & EDDY
388 West Center Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 224-2273
Facsimile: (801)224-2457
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NORTH FORK SPECIAL SERVICE
DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

Case N... 0404012^5

ROBERT BENNION,
Judge Gary Stott
Defendant.
At a hearing held on November 10, 2005, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Partial •• •
Summary Judgment for the base user fees Defendant incurred between January 1. 1997 and
January 1, 2002 in the amount of $3,524.31, which represented the base user fees and accrued
interest. (Order was signed and entered on January 24, 2006).
The remaining issues at trial were 1) whether or not Defendant was responsibleforthe
excess water usage along a lateral water line servicing his property and 2) whether Plaintiff is
entitled to the attorneys' fees it incurred in prosecuting this mattei

\ bench trial w as held on

this matter on October 10, 2008 before Judge Gary Stott, Plaintiff was represented by Kasey L.
Wnght and Melissa K Mellor of Hansen, Wright, and Eddy, and Defendant was represented by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Claire SummerhiU. After hearing testimony and receiving evidence presented, this Court issues
the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

North Fork Special Service District ("Plaintiff") is a special service district organized
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.

2.

Plaintiff provides water services, garbage collection services, and fire protection services
to properties located within its boundaries.

3.

Defendant Robert F. Bennion ("Defendant") owns certain real property ("Property")
within North Fork's district boundaries. Defendant has continuously owned the Property
prior to November 1997 through the present.

4.

From November 1997 through the present, the water services provided by Plaintiff to
properties within its boundaries included the operation of a water delivery system. The
water delivery system,operated by Plaintiff is the mechanism that provides culinary water
to properties within Plaintiffs district boundaries.

5.

Plaintiff is responsible for the maintenance of the main water lines of its water delivery
system.

6.

Plaintiff is not responsible for maintenance of lateral water lines that connect to the main
water lines of Plaintiff s water delivery system. Rather, individual property owners are
• responsible for the maintenance of lateral water lines servicing their properties.

7.

Prior to November 1997 through the present, Defendant has been the owner of the lateral
water line from the point it connects to the Plaintiffs main water line at a meter box
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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located north of Defendant's Property to the meter box south of Defendant's property that
is located on Pamela Vincent's property This lateral water line will hereina tier k:
referred to as "the Bennion Lateral Water Line".
8.

The Court's finding that Defendant is the owner of the Bennion Water Line during the
identified time period is based in part on Defendant's testimony that he owned such water
line and upon his previous actions, including legal actions, where he asserted ownership
to the Bennion Lateral Water Line. The Court's finding that Defendant is Hir owna of
the Bennion Lateral Water Line is also based on the testimony presented by Plaintiffs
employees".

9.

At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff charged members of the service district a
base-user fee for water, fire, and garbage services. Plaintiff had. "the right to charge an
excess water use fee to its members who use more than 5,000.00 gallons during a month
The amount Plaintiff charged members for excess water use was based on a graduated
scale adopted by PlaintifPs Board.

10.

Between November 1997 and May 1, 1998, approximately 1,649,000 gallons of water
was taken out of Plaintiff s water svstein b> way at" the Bennion Lateral Water Line.

11.

Defendant is responsible for the water that is taken out of PlaintifPs water system by way
of the Bennion Lateral Water Line regardless of whether Defendant actually uses such
water or whether the water is lost through leaks loca ted in the Bennion Lateral Water
Line. This finding is based on the Court's finding that Defendant is the owner of the
Bennion Lateral Water Line. The Court's finding that Defendant is responsible for the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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water that is used or lost through the Bennion Lateral Water Line is also based on the
testimony presented at trial that Defendant prohibited Plaintiff from placing a meter on
the Bennion Lateral Water Line that would have more accurately determined how much
water was actually used by Defendant.
12.

Pursuant to the graduated scale adopted by Plaintiffs Board, Plaintiff billed Defendant
$ 11,706.98 for the excess wrater that went through the Bennion Lateral Water Line
between November 1997 and May 1,1998.

13.

Defendant is responsible for the excess water use on the Bennion Lateral Water Line.

14.

Plaintiff is obligated to pay Plaintiff SI 1,706.98 for excess water use from November 1,
1997, through May 1,1998.

15.

At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiffs Board authorized Plaintiff to charge interest
at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on delinquent accounts.

16.

Defendant has not paid Plaintiff $11,706.98 for the excess water use between November
1997 and May 1,1998.

17.

At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff has provided Defendant with regular
statements of the fees that he owes to Plaintiff for the services provided by Plaintiff.

18.

Plaintiff has provided water, garbage, and fire protection services to Defendant from
November 1, 1997 to the present.

19.

Defendant has never voluntarily made a payment to Plaintiff for the services Plaintiff has •
provided to Defendant.

20.

Plaintiff has incurred reasonable attorneys' fees in this matter totaling $37,980.00.
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21.

Defendant filed a Counterclaim in this case. Defendant's Counterclaim alleged that
Plaintiff authorized and permitted an illegal connection to the Bennion I a teral Water
Line in violation of federal, state, and local law. Defendant's Counterclaim also alleged
that Plaintiff had permitted or performed repairs to the Bennion Lateral Vv ater Line in
violation of federal, state, and local laws.

22.

On October 12, 2004, Judge Derek P. Pullan of Fourth District Court dismissed
Defendant's Counterclaim. One of the Court's reasons for dismissing Defendant, •
Counterclaim was on the basis ofres judicata. Specifically, the Court found that the
issues raised by Defendant in its Counterclaim were either previously presented oi w ere
available to be presented in a previous action that was dismissed with prejudice.

23.

On October 1.3. 2004, Defendant filed a motion for the Court to reconsider its dismissal
of Defendant's Counterclaim.

24.

The Court denied Defendant's motion to reconsider on or about February L 2005.

25.

On January 24, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Partial

SLUMP xrv J udgment

regarding the base user fees. The Court's Order stated that Plaintiff had the right to
charge base 'fees to its members and that Defendant is responsible to pay Plaintiff the
base user fees. The Court's Order also warned the Defendant against promoting litigation
without a reasonable basis.
26.

Defendant appealed the Court's Summary Judgment Order regarding Defendant's
obligation to pay the base user fees to the Utah Supreme Court on February 27, 2006.

27.

Defendant's appeal., was dismissed by the Utah Court of Appeals.
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28.

Defendant's defenses and claims in this matter had no basis in fact or law and were
therefore without merit.

29.

Defendant acted in bad faith in this case by promoting litigation without a reasonable
basis. Defendant's promotion of litigation without a reasonable basis is evidenced by the
claims, defenses, and appeal enumerated in paragraphs 21 through 27 herein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Defendant is the owner of the Bennion Lateral Water Line.,

2.

Defendant is responsible for the maintenance, including repair of leaks, of the Bennion
Lateral Water Line from the meter box where the Bennion Lateral Water Line connects to'
North Fork's main water line until the meter box at the Pamela Vincent property.

3.

Defendant is obligated to pay Plaintiff the established fee for the garbage, water, and fire
protection services that Plaintiff provides to D efendant5 s Property.

4.

Defendant owes Plaintiff $ 11,706.98 for excess water use between November 1997 and
May 1,1998.

5.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the
delinquent amount of $11,706.98. Such interest shall accrue from August 1, 1998.

6.

Pursuant to §78B-5-825 Utah Code Ann., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys'
against Defendant in the amount of S37,980.00.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ORDER
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the principal amount c f
$ 11,706.98 for Defendant's excess water usage from November 1997 through May 1,
1998.
Plaintiff is awarded interest on the judgment at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, from August 1, 1998 through October 10.. 2008, for a total interest amount of
$14,284.84.
Plaintiff is entitled to continuing interest at the rate of 12% per annum until the judgment
is paid in fill] ,
The Court shall release to Plaintiff the remaining bond previously posted by Defendant in
this casein the amount of $12,475.69. as partial satisfaction of this judgment.
Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against Defendant for the reasonable attorneys' fees it
incurred in this matter in the.amount of $37,980.00.

DA TED this

p) _ day of

' V\JJ\J^M^—

, 2008.

B Y THE COURT:

QMuD,
JUDGE GARY/OTOTT" '•'"
Fourth JudicialiJistrict Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this
^

day of October, 2008, to the following:

Claire Summerhill
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 956
West Jordan, Utah 84088

SECRETARY
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FEB 2 ? 2001

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAMELA VINCENT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT BENNION,
Defendant and Counter
Claimant,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
Case No. 980405600
PAMELA VINCENT, AND NORTH FORK
SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT,
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Counter Defendants.

ROBERT BENNION,
Defendant, Counter
Claimant and Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.

NORTH FORK LAND COMPANY, a
dissolved Utah corporation,
NORTH PINE PROPERTY OWNERS

Third P.niv Dol'endanl

Before the Court is Third Party Defendant North Fork Land Company's Motion to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Dismiss. The Court having reviewed all relevant memoranda, now grants the motion to dismiss.
FACTS
1.

Plaintiff Pamela Vincent and Defendant/Plaintiff Robert Bennion are neighbors residing in
the North Fork of Provo Canyon just off the Alpine Loop Road.

2.

Pamela Vincent has occupied her home for approximatelyfiveyears. Robert Bennion has
owned or had an interest in his home for approximately 10 years.

3.

Robert Bennion allowed a previous owner of a nearby resident X to tap into and build a
second water linefromRobert Bennion's water line that currently goes to his residence.

4.

The previous owner of Pamela Vincent's home later tapped into the nearby resident X's
waterline and built a third water line goingfromthe residence's water line to Pamela
Vincent's home.

5.

On about September 16, 1998, Robert Bennion mechanically altered the connections in a
junction box located where the residential water line servicing Pamela Vincent and Robert
Bennion's homes branchfromthe main water line so as to shut off all the water along the
road on which the parties' live.

6.

On September 21, 1998, Pamela Vincentfileda complaint and obtained a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining Robert Bennionfrominterfering with the delivery of water
along the water line servicing both his residence and Pamela Vincent's residence.

7.

Robert Bennion answered andfileda counterclaim against Pamela Vincent and Counter
Defendant North Fork Special Service District claiming that he had never granted Pamela
Vincent or the preceding owner to tap into X's water line, nor did he give the nearby
resident X authority to grant such permission to Pamela Vincent or the previous owner of
Pamela Vincent's residence. The counterclaim against North Fork Special. Service District
claims that the District has no ownership right in Robert Bennion's pipeline and has no
right to continue providing water to Pamela Vincent through his water line without just
compensation.
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On November 2), 1998, Robert Bennion entered a third party complaint against Third
Party Defendants, North Fork Land Company (Land Company) and North Pine Property
Owners Association (Owner's Association). Both third party Defendants are dissolved
Utah corporations. The Land * • . ,
Pan, : * • *.
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Robert Bennion alleges

that the Land Company and The Owners Association agreed to provide each lot in the
subdivision in which Pamela Vincent resides with water from a culinary water system and
that they have failed to do so, causing Bennion damages.
Plaintiff Vincent and Defendant Beiin ion took positive step& tow ard settleinci 1 but did not
succeed Defendant Bennion5s counsel withdrew from, the case November 9/2000 and
Mr. Bennion proceeded pro se
On November 27, 2000, North Fork Land Company filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
that Robert Bennion's cause of action is barred by two Statutes of Limitations.
On December 18, 2000, N orth Foi k I and Compan} fl led a Notice to Submit leu Decision.
On Decembei 21 , 2000., Robert Bennion faxed to the Court: a "Comment on Motion to
Dismiss of Attorneys for North Fork Land Company" and "Additive Amendments And
Parties. Modified North Fork Land Claims." No Mailing Certificate or Return of Service
was included.
( '\ , a ^ a / - -'* „
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t* Bl .K •)-.;. '-."^ i' s < "r, ; ,>rk :.a.\: i.ompany l*> h m'\u-" Officers and Owners. \ o
Mailing Certificate or Return of Service was included.
On January 29, 2001, Robert Bennion filed his Arguments Against Motion to Block
Discovery of North Fork Land Company Its Former Officers and Owners A 1\ Jailing
Certificate was uuiuilnl
ANALYSIS AND RULING
Third Party Defendant North Fork Land Company argues that Third Party Plaintiff Robert
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Bennion failed to bring his claims within two (2) years of North Fork Land Company's dissolution
and the claims are therefore barred by Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (repealed 1992). North Fork
Land Company also argues that Robert Bennion failed to bring this action within six (6) years of
the date of the abandonment of the construction of the water delivery system in approximately
1991 and therefore his claims are barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5.
Mr. Bennion argues that North Fork Land company defrauded Utah County citizens and
violated Utah County Zoning Ordinance § 7-27-A, B which requires that persons assisting in land
development are liable for obtaining valid permits and obeying ordinances. Mr. Bennion argues
that under United States Code § 26A-1-123, a corporation or its officers remain liable forever for
any violation of public sanitation or zoning ordinance and that the statute of limitations does not
apply. In addition, Mr. Bennion argues that Utah County Zoning Ordinance §l-6-H provides that
"an unlawful use [of land] remains unlawful forever.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(3)(a) provides that an action related to improvements of
property "based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of
completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction." The statute of limitations
begins to run when the last event required to form the elements of the cause of action occurs.
Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1998). The Court finds that in this case, the
statute of limitations began to run when North Fork Land Company abandoned construction of
the water delivery system sometime previous to its dissolution in 1991. Mr. Bennion did not file
his action until November 1998, seven years after the last event required to form the elements of
Mr. Bennion's cause of action. Therefore, the Court concludes that Mr. Bennion's cause of
action is barred by Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-21.5(3)(a). Because the action is barred by this
statute, the Court will not address Defendant's argument that Mr. Bennion's action is barred
under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Robert Bennion did notfilehis complaint within the six (6) year time period
-4-
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allowed for the filing of actions related to improvements cf property. Therefore Plaintiffs action
is barred by Utah Code Annotated §78-12-21.5(3)(a) and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
granted.
Defendant'1 ''ounsel is U» piepair j'i "idei «. onsistcn! wilh this ruling and submit it for the
Court's signature.

DATED this

JU day of.

.,-2001,

BY THE COURT
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RECEIVED

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAMELA VINCENT,
Plaintiff,

...;*. No 980405600
vs.
Date: September 4, 2001
ROBERT BENNION,
Iudge Steven L. Hansen
Defendant s •
vs.

I

PAMELA VAINCENT, AND NORTH
FORK SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT,
Counter Defendants.

B-M *

' **

v'\ * .

v/mpel and Motion for Discovery Sanctions.

The Court, having reviewed and considered all relevant memoranda, now makes the following
ruling:
Plaintiff Pamela Vincent moves to impose sanctions for Defends * -\ • ~-^ ;:- - .^r
failure to comply with disco\ei \ On April .

/« M ' I 'In/ i ml Jci •.:

--. > : „-s request b\ M>

\"rincent for sanctions, but indued Mr Bennion to respond to interrogatories by May 18, 2001
and to pay Mr Howry's attorney fees for failure to appear at a deposition Mr, Bennion's
deposition was set for May 10, 2001 and once again, he failed to appear. In addition, Mr.
Bennion once again failed to respond to Interrogatories and Requests foi Prodi iction :)f
Documents.
\ dditic rial 1> , IVli Bennion has failed to submit any opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to
Compel and Motion for Discovery Sanctions. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion is granted. Mr.
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Bennion's pleadings are stricken and the lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the
Court's signature.
DATED this

S

day of

yCi/Jj

r

2001

BY THE COURT

STEVEN L.

'S|N|lpGBfe#§;
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